We are in a "Golden Age of Proliferation" with respect to the dissemination of nuclear technogy around the world. Even if ostensibly for civilian use, it is not unlikely that in the wake of Iran and North Korea, others like Saudi Arabia, etc. will also seek deterrence weapons capacities.

This means that there will be a growing number of parties entering the nuclear club. This will be inherently destabilizing.

Given that Russia and the U.S. have already slashed their inventories, but the desire for nuclear weapons has not abated in others (largely due to issues of prestige as well as fears concering overwhelming conventional military superiority), the concept that further reductions will lead those aspiring nuclear powers to forego their ambitions borders on the farcical.

Both the United States and Russia will need to address this world of proliferation. Indeed, it is with that in mind that it becomes rather apparent why Russia has shown limited willingness to reduce its tactical weapons. And why should it? China is growing economically and militarily on its border. Iran will probably be a nuclear power and Russia's conventional military capabilities may atrophy to the point where nuclear weapons will have to assume a more important role in its security calculations as its neighborhood finds itself awash with increasing numbers of nuclear powers.

Though Russia's concerns are somewhat reasonable, that does nothing to make it realisitic or acceptable for pragmatic American leaders to continue reducing U.S. numbers much more than they will be should the new START be ratified by the U.S. Senate.

Also, a point not raised by the advocates of "Global Zero" is the question as to what do we do about the "knowledge" to construct nuclear weapons? That will not go away. Consequently, the below, rather extensive, quote from Thomas Schelling encapsulates a real concern with this whole idea of "Global Zero,"

"We are so used to thinking in terms of thousands, or at least hundreds, of nuclear warheads that a few dozen may offer a sense of relief. But if, at the outset of what appears to be a major war, or the imminent possibility of major war, every responsible government must consider that other responsible governments will mobilize their nuclear weapons base as soon as war erupts, or as soon as war appears likely, there will be at least covert frantic efforts, or perhaps purposely conspicuous efforts, to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible. And what then?
…
In summary, a “world without nuclear weapons” would be a world in which the United States, Russia, Israel, China, and half a dozen or a dozen other countries would have hair-trigger mobilization plans to rebuild nuclear weapons and mobilize or commandeer delivery systems, and would have prepared targets to preempt other nations’ nuclear facilities, all in a high-alert status, with practice drills and secure emergency communications. Every crisis would be a nuclear crisis, any war could become a nuclear war. The urge to preempt would dominate; whoever gets the first few weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a nervous world."

Another point never addressed by the Global Zero movement regards the unassailable fact that there have been no "Great Power" conflicts since 1945. How much of that can be attributed to the presence of nuclear weapons?

Certainly, there are ample reasons for concerns with the present status of nuclear arms in the world. However, we have gone a long way towards reducing their numbers already. Moving to reduce them further in a world rampant with ambiguity and rapidly more available nuclear technology seems a dangerous bet in its own right.

It should not be countenanced further in the upper echelons of policymakers.

Greg R. Lawson"