Kaplan on Kissinger and Dealing with a Nuclear Iran
I avoided reading the Kissinger work mentioned in this article because I thought it was likely antiquated in the post Cold War era. Now, with Robert Kaplan's endorsement, I think I shall.
Interestingly, this concept of deterrence is very closely aligned to what I argues in my "Channeling Nixon Goes to China in the Middle East" Op-Ed.
As for my op-ed, I noticed some folks discussing it on a History Channel blog. Given the topicality of it with this article by Kaplan on deterrence, I thought I should offer up my responce to a broader audience even though the thread itself is ol and I responded to it at the time.
They misconstrued my argument, or at least assumed I was suggesting President Obama perfom the Nixonian-triangular like diplomacy.
I was not necessarily doing so.
I was using the famous (if not infamous) "Nixon Goes to China" analogy to break with contemporary conventional wisdon with respect to not just Iran, but the entire geopolitics of the Middle East. It is certainly far from a perfect analogy.
President Obama, due to the perceptions surrounding his perceived "softness", would have a difficult if not impossible time implementing this kind of policy. President Bush (or another fairly conservative Republican with a reputation for hawkishness) would be a more viable candidate for attempting this. Additionally, there must be real threats on the table for this to work. Without a willingness to use force, up to and including existential force, there will be no need for Iran to come to the table as it will believe that the "tough talk" is really rhetorical throat clearing that is worthless when push comes to shove.
In other words, Iran must fear that the U.S. would be willing to engage in an extreme act prior to serious negotiation commencing. Once that is adequately conveyed, discussions can begin on what constitutes inviolable lines with respect to behavior as well as the myriad of realistic carrots to be offered.
The key here is to break the logjam surrounding conventional wisdom. As it stands today, the U.S. will accept de facto Iranian nuclearization and then work to contain Iran while continuing its overly cozy relations with the Saudis without gaining any diplomatic flexibility. Indeed, there is some reason to believe Sunni powers may seek accomodation with Iran while offering token support to America's forthcoming containment initiatives. This could, over time, neuter America's power in the most significant energy region of the world.
In order to not get pushed out of the region and lose its ability to act as arbiter or "offshore balancer" in IR speak, the US must be creative.
The real goal of this policy is less about the nuclear issue per se, than about the regional balance of power and assuring America's ability to continue playing the decisive security role in the region.
Interestingly, prior to the 1979 Revolution, the US was very close to Iran. Obviously, Ahmadinejad, and more importantly Ali Khameini, are not the Shah. But Iran's geopolitical footprint is still quite meaningful and can't necessarily be contained.
It may not be Obama, but someone needs to reconceptualize the US approach to the region. It should be neither overly bellicose and militant as some might argue was the case in the previous Administration, but neither can it float airily along with abstract protestations of reaching out the the Muslim world. Hard calculations must be made based on various competing interests.
Iran is a thorny problem, but it is a problem that will need to be addresses at some point. The question is, will it be through American initiative, or Iranian?
Interestingly, this concept of deterrence is very closely aligned to what I argues in my "Channeling Nixon Goes to China in the Middle East" Op-Ed.
As for my op-ed, I noticed some folks discussing it on a History Channel blog. Given the topicality of it with this article by Kaplan on deterrence, I thought I should offer up my responce to a broader audience even though the thread itself is ol and I responded to it at the time.
They misconstrued my argument, or at least assumed I was suggesting President Obama perfom the Nixonian-triangular like diplomacy.
I was not necessarily doing so.
I was using the famous (if not infamous) "Nixon Goes to China" analogy to break with contemporary conventional wisdon with respect to not just Iran, but the entire geopolitics of the Middle East. It is certainly far from a perfect analogy.
President Obama, due to the perceptions surrounding his perceived "softness", would have a difficult if not impossible time implementing this kind of policy. President Bush (or another fairly conservative Republican with a reputation for hawkishness) would be a more viable candidate for attempting this. Additionally, there must be real threats on the table for this to work. Without a willingness to use force, up to and including existential force, there will be no need for Iran to come to the table as it will believe that the "tough talk" is really rhetorical throat clearing that is worthless when push comes to shove.
In other words, Iran must fear that the U.S. would be willing to engage in an extreme act prior to serious negotiation commencing. Once that is adequately conveyed, discussions can begin on what constitutes inviolable lines with respect to behavior as well as the myriad of realistic carrots to be offered.
The key here is to break the logjam surrounding conventional wisdom. As it stands today, the U.S. will accept de facto Iranian nuclearization and then work to contain Iran while continuing its overly cozy relations with the Saudis without gaining any diplomatic flexibility. Indeed, there is some reason to believe Sunni powers may seek accomodation with Iran while offering token support to America's forthcoming containment initiatives. This could, over time, neuter America's power in the most significant energy region of the world.
In order to not get pushed out of the region and lose its ability to act as arbiter or "offshore balancer" in IR speak, the US must be creative.
The real goal of this policy is less about the nuclear issue per se, than about the regional balance of power and assuring America's ability to continue playing the decisive security role in the region.
Interestingly, prior to the 1979 Revolution, the US was very close to Iran. Obviously, Ahmadinejad, and more importantly Ali Khameini, are not the Shah. But Iran's geopolitical footprint is still quite meaningful and can't necessarily be contained.
It may not be Obama, but someone needs to reconceptualize the US approach to the region. It should be neither overly bellicose and militant as some might argue was the case in the previous Administration, but neither can it float airily along with abstract protestations of reaching out the the Muslim world. Hard calculations must be made based on various competing interests.
Iran is a thorny problem, but it is a problem that will need to be addresses at some point. The question is, will it be through American initiative, or Iranian?
Posted by Greg R Lawson at 12/15/2011 4:47 PM 
Categories: RobertKaplan Kissinger Iran MiddleEast Nuclear History
Tags: RobertKaplan Kissinger Iran MiddleEast Nuclear History
Categories: RobertKaplan Kissinger Iran MiddleEast Nuclear History
Tags: RobertKaplan Kissinger Iran MiddleEast Nuclear History
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