The below is a train of comments between myself and Thomas P.M. Barnett regarding the possibility of conflict with China.  Note, I do not believe this is in any way preordained.  I just believe it is possible while, despite his protestations, I do not think Mr. Barnett sees that as realistic.

 "Me: Though I know we disagree on the long-term potential for serious major power conflict (I see it as quite possible, though not inevitable and you seem to see it as close to impossible), I agree that the China as competing Superpower that will overtake America meme is overwrought. It is possible to envision a serious, long-term cooperative relationship.

 You rightly point out that China has many internal challenges and insecurities that most in the West do not pay much attention to along the path to their assumptions regarding inevitable conflict.

Of course, to be prepared for conflict even if unlikely remains a necessity and, in my estimation, should not be trivialized as reckless alarmism, but, rather, should be seen as prudential statesmanship.

 Mr. Barnett: Greg, I don't define anything as impossible. I simply don't see any sea change in the larger realities that have kept a firm moratorium on great power war since 1945. China rising doesn't change the nuclear warfare equations, and those still sit on top of any conflict scenario. So if those held during the Cold War, then I'm supposed to think everything's more iffy now that markets have spread and all our major competitors are getting richer? If nukes + a declining opponent with an anti-capitalism worldwide revolution dream + all manner of rivalry in third power situations doesn't get me a great-power war over 45 years, then somehow I should be more unsettled by nukes + marketization and rising incomes and a deep embrace of capitalism + no real rivalry in a military sense anywhere in third power situations?

 All you can say about me is that I find these assumptions and scenarios about inevitable great-power wars with China to all be rather underwhelming and unimaginative in their unwillingness to get beyond traditional pol-mil thinking and genuinely understand the larger economic and financial interdependency that ain't theory but actual, here-and-now fact.

 But what do businessmen know? They control so little of real-world events while governments run EVERYTHING!

 Me: Mr. Barnett:

 I understand your point. I also think you are mostly spot on in analyzing the current trends in global politics and economics.

 My concern is about the discontinuities. Surprising events that no one foresees that throw conventional wisdom out the window.

 I think the current conventional wisdom, at least among policy elites (though not necessarily military strategists), is that conflict with China is not inevitable and would be devasting as part of "Mutually Assured Economic Destruction." I think the policy elite envision a world where trade and economic competition not war will be the prime conflicts. Your views are particularly shrewd and helpful in conceptualizing this perspective and coming up with reasonable ways of managing international relations within this milieu.

 Indeed, I tend to agree with you that this is the most plausible situation and that China will continue a slow integration into global governance institutions which will slowly alter as it achieves and pushes for greater responsibility. Meanwhile, integrating "Gap" countries into the "Core" will be the main issue over the next several decades.

 However, "globalization's" earlier vintage before 1914 also brought similar perceptions among the business class.

 Though the underyling structure of global politics may have been more propitious for conflict then than now, a single spark ignited a conflagration that fundamentally reordered the world. This took place not because everyone acted rationally in their economic interest. That psychological component of human nature is still with us and drives behavior more than economists often think.

 Consequently, I think this is the lesson of history- one should never be surprised no matter how seemingly counterintuitive a given event may be.

 Nuclear proliferation may the wildcard that upsets the balance."