The QDR and American Allies
An interesting article from the Atlantic Community on how the new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) represents a move towards shifting international security burdens to allies. My initial thoughts below,
"Prudential statesmanship means being able to look to the future and correct course without throwing away lessons of the past.
Clearly, the United States cannot act alone when confronting the myriad of complex problems it faces in the security arena. Building up domestic capacity in other states is prudent. To this extent the QDR represents real sobriety.
However, there must be some concern as to whether or not, given the U.S.' precarious domestic spending and deficit problem, this strategy could be perceived as indicative of a slow mechanism for retrenchment while attempting to bolster paper (as opposed to meaningful) cooperation.
While dealing with counterinsurgencies and terrorists requires a globally interdependent mindset of cooperation on intelligence and training, the specter of Great Power conflict has not altogether been eliminated. Though it may seem more unlikely than at any other point in history, to be unprepared for such a contingency is folly. In order to balance this, the U.S. will still require much of its current infrastructure in R&D, production and, perhaps, even further expansions of military personnel. This goes far beyond our current engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq.
So the real battle should not be "new" vs. "old" paradigms for dealing with security, but an embrace of both "new" and "old" in order to adequately deal with the vagaries of history and the twists of fortune.
Of course, this is a difficult position to hold when much of the current security literature seems obsessively focused on counterinsurgency, terrorism and cyberwarfare. Again, all of these are clearly very relevant and should be dealt with, but we should not be sanguine about the prospects of more traditional types of conflict.
We should take care not to divorce ourselves from the reality that the U.S. cannot outsource security policy to those unable or unwilling to help and still be prepared for the unanticipated. Of course, allies are absolutely pivotal. However, alliances should be thought of less as institutionalized instrumentalities that can address a wide range of responsibilities, but as mutually beneficial instruments that can be deployed on a case by case basis when interests converge sufficiently to warrant or necessitate meaningful cooperation.
The overall point here is that the world is more complex than any single analyst or policymaker can appreciate. We must deal with new challenges brought about by technology every day and allies will play a role in dealing with this. But fears of the past should not be dismissed as purely anachronistic and thus relegated to irrelevance in favor of what may turn out to be momentary exigencies."
"Prudential statesmanship means being able to look to the future and correct course without throwing away lessons of the past.
Clearly, the United States cannot act alone when confronting the myriad of complex problems it faces in the security arena. Building up domestic capacity in other states is prudent. To this extent the QDR represents real sobriety.
However, there must be some concern as to whether or not, given the U.S.' precarious domestic spending and deficit problem, this strategy could be perceived as indicative of a slow mechanism for retrenchment while attempting to bolster paper (as opposed to meaningful) cooperation.
While dealing with counterinsurgencies and terrorists requires a globally interdependent mindset of cooperation on intelligence and training, the specter of Great Power conflict has not altogether been eliminated. Though it may seem more unlikely than at any other point in history, to be unprepared for such a contingency is folly. In order to balance this, the U.S. will still require much of its current infrastructure in R&D, production and, perhaps, even further expansions of military personnel. This goes far beyond our current engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq.
So the real battle should not be "new" vs. "old" paradigms for dealing with security, but an embrace of both "new" and "old" in order to adequately deal with the vagaries of history and the twists of fortune.
Of course, this is a difficult position to hold when much of the current security literature seems obsessively focused on counterinsurgency, terrorism and cyberwarfare. Again, all of these are clearly very relevant and should be dealt with, but we should not be sanguine about the prospects of more traditional types of conflict.
We should take care not to divorce ourselves from the reality that the U.S. cannot outsource security policy to those unable or unwilling to help and still be prepared for the unanticipated. Of course, allies are absolutely pivotal. However, alliances should be thought of less as institutionalized instrumentalities that can address a wide range of responsibilities, but as mutually beneficial instruments that can be deployed on a case by case basis when interests converge sufficiently to warrant or necessitate meaningful cooperation.
The overall point here is that the world is more complex than any single analyst or policymaker can appreciate. We must deal with new challenges brought about by technology every day and allies will play a role in dealing with this. But fears of the past should not be dismissed as purely anachronistic and thus relegated to irrelevance in favor of what may turn out to be momentary exigencies."
Posted by Greg R Lawson at 12/15/2011 4:48 PM 
Categories: QDR US Allies Geopolitics
Tags: QDR US Allies Geopolitics
Categories: QDR US Allies Geopolitics
Tags: QDR US Allies Geopolitics
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